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FINANCIAL FRAUD 
Cleaning Up the Financial Crisis of 2008: 
  Prosecutorial Discretion or Prosecutorial Abdication?  
By Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss 
Bradley T. Borden is a professor at Brooklyn Law School, where he teaches partnership taxation and taxation of 
real estate transactions. He is the author of numerous articles and books. 
David J. Reiss is a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School. His research focuses on the secondary mortgage 
market.  
When finance professionals play fast and loose, big problems result. Indeed, the 2008 Financial Crisis resulted from 
people in the real estate finance industry ignoring underwriting criteria for mortgages and structural finance products. 
That malfeasance filled the financial markets with mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that were worth a small fraction 
of the amount issuers represented to investors. It also loaded borrowers with liabilities that they never had a chance to 
satisfy.  
Despite all the wrongdoing that caused the financial crisis, prosecutors have been slow to bring charges against 
individuals who originated bad loans, pooled bad mortgages, and sold bad MBS. Unfortunately, the lack of individual 
prosecutions signals to participants of the financial industry that wrongdoing not only will go unpunished but will 
likely even be rewarded financially. Without criminal liability, we risk a repeat of the type of conduct that brought us 
to the edge of financial ruin.  
The Bill of Particulars Is Mounting 
There is ample evidence of Wall Street's extensive and critically damaging wrongdoing. Documents such as The 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report have documented wrongdoing in the aggregate.
1
 Recently filed civil lawsuits against 
financial institutions highlight wrongdoing by the organizations themselves, but they also provide glimpses of 
wrongdoing by individuals that was illegal and warrants prosecution. REFinblog.com, a website edited by the authors 
and written by Brooklyn Law School students and the authors, is tracking these cases.  
One of the settlements relating to the robo-signing scandal provides some of the clearest evidence of wrongdoing by 
individuals. While the defendant, LPS, did not admit "any violation of law," there are some interesting admissions.
2
 
They include the fact that some mortgage loan documents executed by employees of LPS subsidiaries contain 
"unauthorized signatures, improper notarizations, or attestations of facts not personally known to or verified by the 
affiant" and some may contain "inaccurate information relating to the identity, location, or legal authority of the 
signatory, assignee, or beneficiary or to the effective date of the assignment."
3
 LPS subsidiaries also "recorded or 
caused to be recorded Mortgage Loan Documents with these defects in local land records offices or executed or 
facilitated execution on behalf of the Servicers knowing some of these Mortgage Loan Documents would be filed in 
state courts or used to comply with statutory, non-judicial foreclosure processes."
4
 And employees of LPS subsidiaries 
signed mortgage loan documents in the name of other employees. Sounds like "violations of law" to us. Only one 
person pleaded guilty for her role in this racket. 
Lawsuits against rating agencies provide some of the most colorful evidence of wrongdoing by individuals. The 
litigation in this area is international. For example, the Federal Court in Australia has held Standard & Poor's liable for 
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misrepresentations it made in ratings of structured financial products.
5
 Similar litigation will likely spread to other 
countries.
6
 Domestically, the Department of Justice and the state of California (among others) have filed lawsuits 
against Standard & Poor's, claiming it made material misrepresentations about its rating processes for MBS.
7
 Some of 
the allegations in these complaints are shocking. 
According to the Department of Justice's complaint, S&P executives  "suppressed development of new, more 
accurate rating models that would have produced fewer AAA ratings—and therefore lower profits and market share."8 
A senior managing director at S&P later said, "I knew it was wrong at the time."
9
 Senior S&P executives allegedly 
stated that its rating models were "massaged" using "magic numbers" and "guesses."
10
 Why would S&P do this? 
According to one executive quoted in the complaint, "The revenue potential was too large."
11
 
Because investor cases are just wending their way through the courts, there have not yet been many findings of fact 
about wrongdoing arising from the Housing Boom of the early 2000s. But they are beginning to appear. In a denial of 
a motion to dismiss, Judge Jed S. Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.) wrote, "The confidential witness statements incorporated into the 
Amended Complaint, combined with the documentary sources, support a strong inference that the [Bear Stearns] 
defendants knew that the mortgages included within the loan pools were not of the quality represented in the offering 
documents."
12
 These are the same types of claims that New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman makes in 
lawsuits filed against JPMorgan Securities and Credit Suisse Securities for wrongdoing related to securitizing 
mortgages.
13
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The claims in this case relate to actions by Bear Stearns entities that JPMorgan acquired in 2008. Mr. Schneiderman 
has brought a similar suit against Credit Suisse. See Complaint, New York v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, No. 
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Recently filed suits by investors also allege disturbing actions that may have criminal implications. Labaton 
Sucharow, a leading securities fraud firm, has filed dozens of lawsuits on behalf of MBS investors against MBS 
sponsors.
14
 Those lawsuits claim that the MBS sponsors made material misrepresentations. For instance, the alleged 
misrepresentations include claims about the occupancy rates of homes secured by mortgages held by MBS trusts. 
Despite representations in the MBS offering materials regarding owner-occupancy rates, the complaint reviews 
studies showing that owner-occupancy was much lower than represented. Studies also show that in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, the originator and MBS sponsor did not properly transfer mortgage notes to the MBS trust. 
Furthermore, despite many uncertainties regarding the tax status of the MBS trusts, the offering materials provided 
that trusts "will" qualify for REMIC tax status—"will" is the highest level of tax certainty available for tax opinions, 
suggesting a 90-95 percent certainty of the position.
15
 If these misrepresentations are proved, they could have 
implications for various criminal fraud statutes. 
Greed Is Legal, But … 
Statutes of limitations will soon bar nearly all remaining claims arising from the MBS mess. We, along with many 
others, wonder why so few of the individuals who profited from packaging and selling horrible MBS have faced 
criminal charges. 
Prosecutors have various reasons to exercise their discretion not to prosecute. The evidence resulting from the 
criminal investigation may not be enough to support the charges. Or the evidence may be sufficient to indict but 
unlikely to result in a conviction. Or the prosecutor may not have the resources to conduct a thorough investigation nor 
the resources to effectively prosecute the case. While the first two reasons are legitimate reasons to abstain from 
prosecuting a case, the last one may, in certain circumstances, amount to an abdication of the prosecutor's role in the 
criminal justice system. We review below some of the reasons that prosecutors may not have pursued cases arising 
from the Financial Crisis in particular. 
One depressing, but legitimate, reason for prosecutorial abstention is that a surprising amount of bad behavior is still 
legal. In the lead-up to the Financial Crisis, lenders, for instance, often took steps to ensure that their loans complied 
with relevant statutes such as the Truth in Lending Act. Unfortunately, the relevant consumer protection statutes and 
regulations were often out of date. As a result, lenders had wiggle room and could make loans that were clearly 
inappropriate for millions of people but that complied with the letter of the law. Going forward, at least, the newly 
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has begun to issue new rules to better regulate the consumer credit 
markets. 
Another, almost counterintuitive, reason to choose not to prosecute is that the parties to these sophisticated contracts 
anticipated a lot of bad behavior. The litigation brought by mortgage insurers like Syncora against Wall Street firms 
such as Bear Stearns subsidiary EMC provides a great example.
16
 Syncora claims that EMC enticed it to provide 
insurance on many fraudulent mortgages, but the agreement between the parties says Syncora's only remedy is to 
return the mortgages to EMC. EMC employees would argue that they did not commit fraud by entering into the 
insurance contract; they merely sought to allocate risk.  
A third reason is that much of the bad behavior may have been driven by greed, not criminal intent. Michael Lewis's 
book The Big Short illustrates that greed in detail.
17
 Some Wall Street executives and managers saw their bonuses go 
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from six figures to eight figures during the Boom because they took advantage of uninformed investors who relied 
upon rating agencies and offering documents to make investment decisions. Greed in itself is not criminal. Juries seem 
to have seen things this way too, at least with respect to two Bear Stearns MBS hedge fund managers whom the jury 
acquitted.
18
 That acquittal may have been taken as a harbinger of prosecutions to come in document-heavy cases of 
financial wrongdoing, and it may be supporting evidence that prosecutors believe that they are unable to make a case 
against individuals.  Indeed, the outgoing Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Lanny 
Breuer, seemed to see it that way: "I understand and share the public's outrage about the financial crisis. Of course we 
want to make these cases. … If there had been a case to make, we would have brought it. I would have wanted nothing 
more, but it doesn't work that way."
19
 
A fourth reason is that proving the guilt of individuals for their work within a corporation presents its own set of 
challenges. A corporation can be charged on the basis of its "collective knowledge" to keep companies from slicing 
and dicing a criminal enterprise into noncriminal components. An employee, on the other hand, cannot be criminally 
charged on the basis of the knowledge of his or her colleagues.
20
 That is, an individual cannot be found guilty unless he 
or she had the requisite mens rea whereas the corporation can be found guilty if the requisite mens rea was found 
among all its employees, a bit here and a bit there. The end result is that there is effectively a much higher burden to 
prove the guilt of the individual employee than that of the corporation itself. 
This leads to the final and perhaps most important potential reason for prosecutorial abstention. Large-scale 
financial crimes are very difficult to prove in the absence of a smoking gun or an informant. Each investigation 
requires extraordinary manpower to sift through hundreds of thousands of documents. Intent can be very hard to 
prove. For every email that describes a pool of mortgages as a "sack of shit"
21
 there are another 50 that discuss how 
well the market had done historically and how the firms' complex computer models indicated that the pool would 
perform well, based upon the past performance of similar products. And most prosecutors, even those in the biggest 
and most elite offices, face technical and training challenges in putting together an effective investigation. A securities 
fraud case based on even a single mortgage-backed security can involve thousands of mortgages originated by many 
different lenders. Numerous hands touch those files at origination as well as during the securitization process. On top 
of that, many of the key documents are missing, or at least their chain of custody is uncertain. The net result is that 
building such a case can be exponentially harder than building even a complex insider trading case. This is particularly 
true because many prosecutor offices do not have the sophisticated software (Excel is not enough!) to track all the 
relevant data or the training (forensic accounting skills for instance) to do an effective job. 
Prosecutors may realize that they can indict in such cases but may have a hard time convicting, as with the Bear 
Stearns hedge fund executives. Prosecutors may also be considering their other serious priorities in making these 
decisions (even though it is difficult to imagine many things more important than the world economy). They may 
believe that civil lawsuits, with their lower burden of proof, provide sufficient justice. They may also believe that 
regulators like the SEC and the IRS are in a better position to investigate and respond to these complex financial 
disasters. These all may appear to be good, measured reasons not to pursue criminal charges against individuals, but 
the lack of convictions still chafes. To the extent that a lack of resources is the reason for no meaningful prosecutions, 
prosecutors should consider reallocating resources to cover this complex field that is so fundamental to our country's 
economy and national security. 
While the complexity of the transactions that led to the Financial Crisis is almost beyond comprehension, there is 
also a simplicity behind what went wrong that should guide investigations. A basic definition of fraud would appear to 
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apply to much of the wrongful behavior. Some individuals had to know (if they did not have actual knowledge, their 
lack of knowledge would appear to be reckless) that the information in offering materials was inaccurate, that 
investors would rely upon the information, and that the investors would suffer harm. They presented the incorrect 
information, and harm resulted.  
The Fight For Justice Is Not Easy 
For every million underwater homeowners, there is also someone like Dick Fuld, Lehman Brothers' CEO during its 
worst excesses in the mortgage markets. He suffered to some extent from the failure of his firm, as he lost his equity 
when it went under. But he also earned a half-billion dollars in compensation during his time there.
22
 That provides a 
troubling coda to our modern morality tale. There are many others who were well (if not that well) compensated 
during the Boom. The evidence is out there that some of them know that "it was wrong at the time." 
Prosecutors' lack of action against more of the individuals within the organizations that sold bad mortgage instruments and 
who oversaw the machinery that produced millions of terrible mortgages is discomfiting. Indeed, by exercising their discretion 
to abstain from prosecution, it appears as if federal prosecutors have abdicated each and every one of their stated roles as it 
relates to the Crisis: To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety 
against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment 
for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.23 
 
 
The financial service industry almost sent the global economy into a death spiral. Its participants should account for 
their roles in that destructive pursuit. If prosecutors continue to refuse to proceed on general criminal charges, the IRS 
should move forward with criminal investigations for representations parties made with respect to arrangements that 
could not qualify for claimed tax treatment. Lawmakers should also consider changing laws, as needed, to facilitate 
prosecution of financial wrongdoers. 
Our laws should encourage managers on Wall Street to scrutinize their decisions before acting and understand that 
the pursuit of short-term profits have long-term consequences for all of society. Successful prosecutions of individuals 
who created the Financial Crisis would help deter future wrongdoing, and prosecutors should allocate resources as 
needed to help with such deterrence. We applaud prosecutors for filing civil lawsuits against institutions, but if they do 
not take actions against individuals, individual actions will, no doubt, lead to another boom and bust when greed and 
bad behavior once again overwhelm a well-ordered market.  
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